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Abstract 
Over the time a large number of reciprocal preferential trade agreements (RTAs) have been 
concluded among countries. Recently many studies have used gravity equations in order to estimate 
the effect of RTAs on trade flows between partners. These studies report very different estimates, since 
they differ greatly in data sets, sample sizes, and independent variables used in the analysis. So, what is 
the “true” impact of RTAs? This paper combines, explains, and summarizes a large number of results 
(1460 estimates included in 75 papers), using a meta-analysis (MA) approach. Notwithstanding quite 
an high variability, studies consistently find a positive RTAs impact on bilateral trade: the hypothesis 
that there is no effect of trade agreements on trade is easily and robustly rejected at standard 
significance levels. We provide pooled estimates, obtained from fixed and random effects models, of 
the increase in bilateral trade due to RTAs. Finally, information collected on each estimate allows us to 
test the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications and differences in the control variables 
considered.  
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1. Introduction. 
Preferential agreements are discriminatory policies entailing trade liberalization with respect to 
a subset of trading partners. The world trading system is characterized by a wide variety of 
preferential agreements, which can be broadly categorized into two major types: reciprocal 
(bilateral), entailing symmetric trade liberalization, and nonreciprocal (unilateral), entailing 
asymmetric trade liberalization aimed at providing support to the country which gains improved 
market access without being required to open up its own domestic market. The latter, as it well 
known, have been widely utilized as an instrument for integrating the developing countries into the 
world trading system. 
Traditionally, reciprocal preferential agreements occurred between geographically contiguous 
countries with already established trading patterns. However, the configuration of these agreements 
is presently diverse and becoming increasingly complex with overlapping agreements spanning 
within and across continents in what Bhagwati calls a “spaghetti bowl” of trade relationships.1 The 
world has witnessed a veritable explosion of reciprocal preferential trade agreements (RTAs) in the 
past 15 years. More than half of world trade now occurs within actual or prospective trading blocs, 
and nearly every country in the world is a member of one or more agreements (Clarete et al., 2003).  
RTAs take many forms. The most common are the free trade area (FTA)—where trade 
restrictions among member countries are removed, but each member maintains its own trade 
policies towards nonmembers—and the customs union—a FTA where members adopt a common 
external trade policy. Deeper forms of integration include a common market—a customs union that 
also allows for the free movement of factors of production—and economic unions, which involve 
some degree of harmonization of national economic policies. New RTAs, indeed, place 
considerable emphasis on liberalisation of services, investments and labour markets, government 
procurement, strengthening of technological and scientific cooperation, environment, common 
competition policies or monetary and financial integration. 
In the literature there are numerous studies analysing the economic impacts of RTAs. The focus 
of this paper is on estimates of the effects on trade. RTAs might be expected to increase trade 
between partners, since cheaper imports within the agreement may replace domestic production –
trade creation – or crowd out imports from the rest of the world – trade diversion (Viner, 1950; 
Meade, 1955). However, in many cases intra-agreement trade flows have been strongly increasing 
even before the formal signature of the agreement, the increases reflecting the impact of unilateral 
and multilateral liberalization, as well as the simple fact that agreements may be due to, rather than 
allow for, growing trade relationships.2 
The purpose of this review is to use a Meta-Analysis (MA) approach to summarize and analyse 
the RTAs trade effects estimated in the literature, mostly through gravity models assessing the 
difference between potential and actual trade flows (see Appendix 1 for details on the agreements 
considered). The approach takes as individual observations the point estimates of relevant 
parameters from different studies. An MA can improve the assessment of the parameter describing 
the RTAs impact by combining all of the estimates, investigating the sensitivity of the overall 
estimate to variations in underlying assumptions, identifying and filtering out publication bias, and 
by explaining the diversity in the study results in relation to the heterogeneity of study features 
through meta-regression analysis (MRA).  
In this paper, we firstly consider all point estimates provided in the literature, i.e. including 
multiple estimates coming from a single study. We test for correlation within and between studies, 
and estimate meta-regression models using weighted least squares (WLS), checking the robustness 
and sensitivity of our results. Then, we focus on the effect on bilateral trade of specific trade 
                                                 
1
 As a consequence we decided not to use the term “regional”, which is traditionally used as a convenient shortcut, but 
is inconsistent with the plethora of agreements linking countries around the globe. 
2
 Also in the case of multilateral agreements, recent empirical work (Rose, 2004) does not find significant differences 
between the trade patterns of countries belonging to the GATT/WTO and those of the. 
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agreements. Finally, we run a probit regression in order to assess what are the most important 
factors explaining a positive (and significant) impact of the agreements on bilateral trade flows. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the literature studying the 
impacts of RTAs on trade, while in Section 3 we present some methodological issues regarding the 
MA approach. In Section 4 we discuss the explanatory variables and present the econometric 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The impact on trade of reciprocal preferential trade agreements 
Empirical research applies econometric approaches to historical trade data in order to assess the 
impact of trade agreements on bilateral trade flows. Usually, these approaches use gravity models, 
based upon Newton’s Law of Gravitation, predicting that the variation in volume of trade between 
two economies increase with their size (proxies are real GDP, population, land area) and decrease 
with transaction costs measured as bilateral distance, adjacency, cultural similarities (Baldwin, 
1994; Eichengreen and Irwin, 1996; Feenstra, 1998; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).  
The standard formulation expresses the bilateral trade between country i and country j as: 
ijijjiij εDistβYβYββT ++++= )ln()ln()ln(ln 3210                                                                        (1) 
where Tij is the country pairs’ trade flow, Yi(j) indicate GDP or GNP of i and j, Distij is the distance 
between i and j, finally εij is the error term. Most applications of the gravity model search for 
evidence of actual or potential effects by adding dummy variables for common languages, for 
common land borders and for the presence or absence of a RTA. Then, the gravity model is 
estimated as: 
ijijijijijjiij RTALangAdjDistYYT εγββββββ +++++++= 543210 )ln()ln()ln(ln                              (2) 
where Adjij is a binary variable assuming the value 1 if i and j share a common land border and 0 
otherwise, Langij is a binary variable assuming the value 1 if i and j share a common language and 0 
otherwise, RTAij is a binary variable assuming the value 1 if i and j have a reciprocal trade 
agreement in place and 0 otherwise. A positive coefficient for the RTA variable indicates that it 
tends to generate more trade among its members. In MA, the parameter of interest (estimate of γ) is 
commonly referred to as the “effect size”. 
Many papers find positive and statistically significant RTAs dummies, although they are not 
primarily interested in estimating the RTA effect, i.e. the existence of an RTA is only included as a 
control variable. On the other hand, if there is a particular interest on specific RTAs, different 
dummies may be introduced for each agreement (see Appendix 1). 
Some authors distinguish between the increase in the volume of trade within the bloc and the 
decrease in trade from countries outside the bloc (i.e., trade diversion) by including two dummies 
for intrabloc and extrabloc trade. An example of a gravity equation that takes in account the trade 
creation and diversion effects is: 
ijjkikijijijijjiij RTARTALangAdjDistYYT εγγββββββ −+++++++= 21543210 )ln()ln()ln(ln            (3) 
where RTAkij is a dummy taking value 1 if both i and j are members of bloc k and zero otherwise, 
and RTAki-j is a dummy taking value 1 if i is a member of the bloc but j is not. Accordingly, γ1 is the 
coefficient measuring the extent to which trade is influenced by the agreement between i and j 
(intrabloc trade), and γ2 is the coefficient associated with extrabloc trade.  
Greenaway and Milner (2002) claim that although the impact of any trade agreement is a 
combination of trade creation and diversion effects, gravity modellers rarely tried to decompose 
these effects by using dummy variables for members of trade blocs and for non-members, with the 
expectation of negative coefficients for the latter. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and Frankel and 
Wei (1997) find evidence of trade creation in European trading blocs from 1970 to 1990, as well as 
Martìnez-Zarzoso et at (2003), and Mayer and Zignano (2005) for EU and MERCOSUR during the 
1990s. Also, Jayasinghe and Sarker (2004) show positive effects for NAFTA in trade of selected 
agrifood products. Rauch (1996) and Sapir (2001) find negative and significant effect for EFTA. 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
 4 
Other RTAs as LAIA and MERCOSUR appear to have been net trade creating in some studies 
(Gosh and Yamarik, 2002; Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004; Soloaga and Winters, 2000) and net trade 
diverting in some others (Carrère, 2006; Krueger, 1999). More recent works (Gosh and Yamarik, 
2002; Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004; Cheng and Tsai, 2005; Lee and Park, 2005; Martìnez-Zarzoso and 
Horsewood, 2005; Carrère, 2006) support the idea that free trade arrangements are generally trade 
creating.  
Recent works investigate on the robustness of the determinants of international of trade by 
means of extreme-bounds analysis.3 Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) show that the trade-creating effect 
is highly sensitive to the choice of other variables included or excluded from the gravity model. 
Thus, the empirical evidence seems to be rather “fragile”. Another work by Baxter and Kouparitsas 
(2006) tests the robustness of the RTA dummy in gravity equations using three different extreme-
bounds approaches. Their analysis gives a mixed view of the relationship between free trade areas 
and the level of bilateral trade: different methods lead to different outcomes, so results are 
inconclusive. 
The standard estimation method used in gravity equations is the ordinary least squares (OLS). A 
recent work by Egger (2005) compares four different estimators with respect to their suitability for 
cross-section gravity models. He recommends a Hausman–Taylor approach that provides consistent 
parameter estimates, while OLS or the traditional random-effects model are biased. 
Most of the articles run regressions from cross-section data either for a single year or for 
multiple years. Even if panel data allow to pin down the estimates of persistent effects with more 
accuracy, only very recently gravity equations have been estimated using panel data techniques.  
Usually, empirical studies do not take account the endogeneity problem, since countries might 
enter into a RTA for reasons unobservable to the econometrician and possibly correlated with the 
level of trade. Baier and Bergstrand (2005) address the endogeneity problem using instrumental 
variables, Heckman’s control-function (CF) techniques (Heckman, 1997), and panel-data estimates. 
They find that the best method to estimate the effect of RTAs on bilateral trade flows is through 
differenced panel data, while instrumental variables applied to cross-section data are biased and 
underestimated.  
The Global Economic Prospects (2005) of the World Bank provides a meta-analysis of the 
literature on the impact of regional trade agreements on intra- and extra-regional trade. It finds that 
although these agreements typically have a positive impact on intra-regional trade, their overall 
impact is uncertain. The analysis considers 17 research studies providing 362 estimates of the 
impact on the level of trade between partners. The mean value of these estimates is positive, but 
there is a high degree of variance about the mean. 
In this study we collect papers that: (1) use gravity models for analysing bilateral trade flows; 
(2) include dummy variables for the presence of RTAs; (3) estimate coefficients through cross-
section or panel analyses.  
 
 
3. Methodological issues 
MA is a set of quantitative techniques for evaluating and combining empirical results from 
different studies (Rose and Stanley, 2005). The central concern of MA is to test the null hypothesis 
that different point estimates, treated as individual observations (γ), are equal to zero when the 
findings from this entire area of research are combined.4  
                                                 
3
 Econometric technique testing the robustness of estimated coefficients to changes in a conditioning set of information 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
4
 Under the null hypothesis of no effect (γ = 0), no publication selection and independence, the statistic minus twice the 
sum of the logarithms of the p-values is distributed approximately as a χ2 with 2n degrees of freedom (Fisher, 1932).  
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
 5 
MA has recently been growing in popularity in economics.5 Empirical economists have 
increasing employed meta-analysis methods to summarize regression results particularly in 
environmental economics (van den Bergh et al, 1997; Florax, 2002, Jeppesen et al 2002), labour 
economics (Card and Krueger, 1995; Jarrel and Stanley, 1990; Stanley and Jarrel, 1998; Ashenfelter 
et al., 1999; Longhi et al, 2005; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005; and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 
2005), monetary economics (Knell and Stix, 2005) and international trade (Disdier and Head, 2004; 
Rose and Stanley, 2005). 
Although MA is an appealing technique for evaluating and combining empirical results, there is 
a risk to analyze completely different outcome variables or different explanatory variables (the 
“Apples and Oranges Problem” as referred to by Glass et al, 1981). In this respect, it is crucial the 
first step of any MA, namely the construction of a database of estimates. In this application, we only 
used papers written in English. Papers were selected via extensive search in Google and in 
databases, such as EconLit and Web of Science. EconLit provides coverage since 1969 to the 
economics literature including 750 journals. Web of Science provides access to current and 
retrospective multidisciplinary information from approximately 8700 of the most prestigious, high 
impact research journals in the world (199 journals in the field of economics), covering the time 
period from 1992 to the present. With the search in Google, we get papers and working papers that 
are not published in academic journals. Finally, we traced some specific papers cross-referenced in 
other works.  
The keywords searched for were: “trade agreements”, “gravity equation or gravity model” in the 
title, the abstract or the subject. The first keyword permits to get the papers dealing with trade 
agreements, while the second keyword sorts out papers using a gravity approach. Among the first 
group of papers we select the papers analyzing trade agreements focusing on bilateral trade flows; 
in the second group, we selected those studies including trade agreements as a control variable in 
the gravity equation. 
The final sample includes 75 papers (38 published in academic journals, 37 are working papers 
or unpublished studies) providing 1460 point estimates of the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade: 
i.e., the coefficient γ or γ1 in equations (2) and (3), respectively (see Appendices 2 and 3 for details). 
In case some agreements changed their nature from “unilateral” to “reciprocal” over time, we did 
not consider the estimates referring to periods when there were only preferential tariff reductions.  
It happens quite often that a study provide multiple estimates of the effect under consideration. 
The presence of more that one estimated reported per study is problematic, because the assumption 
that multiple observations from the same study are independent draws becomes too strong. On the 
other hand, counting all estimates equally would tend to overweight studies with many estimates 
(Stanley, 2001).  
Various solutions have been suggested in the literature. Some authors include a dummy variable 
(fixed effect) for each study that provided more than one observation (Jarrell and Stanley, 1990), 
others use a panel specification (Jeppesen et al., 2002, Disdier and Head, 2004). Alternatively, one 
may decide to represent each study with a single observation, identifying a “preferred” estimate, 
using averages or medians of the estimates from each paper, or randomly selecting one estimate 
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Stanley, 2001; and Rose and Stanley, 2005). In this case, though, 
important information is lost in the grouping process and it is not clear which estimate one should 
use (Jeppensen et al, 2002).  
Pooling different estimates into a large sample for meta-analysis raises the question of within-
study versus between study heterogeneity. In order to take this into account, a distinction between a 
fixed effect (FE) and a random effect (RE) models can be made: the former assume that differences 
across studies are only due to within-variation; the latter consider both between study and within-
study variability, and assume that the studies are a random sample from the universe of all possible 
studies (Sutton et al., 2000). 
                                                 
5
 In 2005, the Journal of Economic Surveys dedicated a Special Issue (Vol.19, No. 3) to the use of meta-regression 
analysis. 
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More specifically, the fixed-effects model assumes that a single, “true” effect ( Fθˆ )underlies 
every study. Following Higgins and Thompson (2002), the Fθˆ  is calculated as a weighted average 
of the study estimates, using the precisions as weights: 
∑
∑
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=
=
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θ                                                                                                                                      (4) 
where iθˆ  is the individual estimate of the RTA effect (our γi), and the weights wi are inversely 
proportional to the square of the standard errors: 
2)ˆ(
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θSe
w =                                                                                                                                      (5) 
So that studies with smaller standard errors have greater weight that studies with larger standard 
errors.  
A field of the literature showing high heterogeneity cannot be summarized by the fixed-effects 
estimate under the assumption that a single “true” effect underlies every study. As a consequence, 
the fixed-effects estimator is inconsistent and the random effects model is more appropriate. 
The random-effects model assumes that there are real differences between all studies in the 
magnitude of the effect. Unlike the fixed effects model, the individual studies are not assumed to be 
estimating a true single effect size, rather the true effects in each study are assumed to have been 
sampled from a distribution of effects, assumed to be Normal with mean _0 and variance τ2. The 
weights incorporate an estimate of the between-study heterogeneity, 2τˆ , so that the random effects 
estimate ( Rθˆ ) is equal to (Higgins and Thompson, 2002): 
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where the weights are equal to: 
121* )ˆ( −− += τww ii                                                                                                                              (7). 
Allowing for the extra between-study variation has the effect of reducing the relative weighting 
given to the more precise studies. Hence, the random effects model produces a more conservative 
confidence interval for the pooled effect estimate. 
A test of homogeneity of the iθ is provided by referring the statistic 
( )2
1
ˆˆ∑
=
−=
n
i
FiwQ θθ                                                                                                                             (8). 
to a 2χ  distribution with n −1 degrees of freedom. If Q exceeds the upper-tail critical value, the 
observed variance in estimated effect sizes is greater than what we would expect by chance if all 
studies shared the same ‘true’ parameter (Higgins and Thompson, 2002).6 
The Q test should be used cautiously, among other things because its power is low (Sutton 
2000): when we have a large sample of observations, for example, Q is likely to be rejected even 
                                                 
6
 A moment-based estimate of 2τˆ may be obtained by (8) equating the observed value of Q with its expectation 
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when the individual effect sizes do not differ much. Anyway, its computation is an intermediate 
step to compute the preferred tests – H2 and I2 – that we are going to use in our analysis. 
The statistic H2 provides a possible measure of the amount of heterogeneity: 
1
2
−
=
n
QH                                                                                                                                         (9) 
through the ratio of Q over its degrees of freedom. In absence of heterogeneity  
1][ −= nQE                                                                                                                                     (10), 
so that H2 = 1 indicates homogeneity in effect sizes. 
The I2 statistic, on the other hand, measures the proportion inconsistency in individual studies, 
that cannot be explained by change: 
Q
nQ
H
HI 112
2
2 +−
=
−
=                                                                                                                   (11) 
Values close to 1 denote a high degree of heterogeneity. Multiplied by 100, the I2 statistic describes 
the percentage of variability in point estimates that is due to heterogeneity rather than sampling 
error. In the following, we will assign adjectives of low, moderate, and high to values of I2 lower or 
equal to 25%, 50%, and 75%. respectively. 
The simple mean of estimates could be misleading in presence of more than one mode or 
outliers in the sample of estimates, because a large part of the estimates may lie to one side of the 
mean value. If the distribution is multimodal or there are outliers (as extreme data points) the mean 
could be biased. Skewness is usually tested by comparing mode, median and mean of the 
distribution. However, this would not be true in the case of symmetrically distributed outliers, since 
they tend to cancel out each other, or when outliers have smaller statistical weights than other data 
points so that they contribute less to the mean. In any case, some authors prefer to remove the 
outliers, since they compress the variation of the rest of the sample and are likely to lead to fragile 
findings (Disdier and Head, 2004); while others claim that removing outliers and extreme results at 
an early stage of the meta-analysis could introduce (substantial) bias into the meta-results, and the 
influence of removing outliers should be explored in a sensitivity analysis (Stanley 2001, Florax 
2002). 
Finally, there is a general belief that publication bias exists because research with statistically 
significant, or interesting, results is potentially more likely to be submitted and published than work 
with null or nonstatistically significant, or uninteresting results. The presence of publication bias 
may greatly affect the magnitude of the estimated effect. Publication bias occurs when researchers, 
referees, or editors have a preference for statistically significant results. Some meta-regression and 
graphical methods can differentiate genuine empirical effect from publication bias (Stanley, 2005).  
The simplest and conventional method to detect publication bias is by inspection of a funnel 
graph diagram. The funnel graph is a scatter diagram presenting a measure of sample size or 
precision of the estimate on the vertical axis, and the measured effect size on the horizontal axis. 
The most common way to measure precision is the inverse of the standard error (1/Se). Asymmetry 
is the mark of publication bias: in the absence of such a bias, the estimates will vary randomly and 
symmetrically around the true effect. The diagram, then, should resemble an inverted funnel, wide 
at the bottom for small-sample studies, narrowing as it rises. 
A Meta-regression Analysis (MRA) model can be used to investigate and correct publication 
bias. The model regresses estimated coefficients (γi) on their standard errors (Card and Krueger, 
1995; Ashenfelter et al 1999): 
iii εSeββγ ++= 01                                                                  (12) 
In the absence of publication selection, the magnitude of the reported effect will vary randomly 
around the ‘true’ value, β1, independently of its standard error. Then, when the standard error of the 
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effect of RTA is not significantly different from 0 at any conventional level, the publication bias is 
not a major issue.7 
Since the studies in the literature may differ greatly in data sets, sample sizes, independent 
variables, variances of these estimated coefficients may not be equal. As a consequence, meta-
regression errors are likely to be heteroscedastic, but the OLS estimates of the MRA coefficients 
remain unbiased and consistent. 
A weighted least squares (WLS) corrects the MRA for heteroscedasticity, and permits to obtain 
efficient estimates of equation (12) with correct standard errors. The WLS version of equation (12) 
is obtained dividing regression equation by the individual estimated standard errors: 
iii
i
i eSeββt
Se
γ
++== )/1(10                                                        (13) 
where ti is the conventional t-value for γi, the intercept and slope coefficients are reversed and the 
independent variable becomes the inverse of Sei.8 Thus, the potential for heteroscedasticity causes 
the meta-analyst to direct his attention towards the reported t-statistics (Stanley and Jarrell, 2005). 
Equation (13) is the basis for the funnel asymmetry test (FAT), and it may now be estimated by 
OLS. In the absence of publication selection the magnitude of the reported effect will be 
independent of its standard error, then β0 will be zero.  
Stanley (2001) proposes a method to remove or circumvent publication selection by using the 
relationship between a study’s standardized effect (its t-value) and its degrees of freedom or sample 
size n as a means of identifying genuine empirical effect rather than the artefact of publication 
selection: 
iii vnααt ++= lnln 10                                                           (14) 
When there is some genuine overall empirical effect, statistical power will cause the observed 
magnitude of the standardized test statistic to vary with n: this method is known as meta-
significance testing (MST). 
Information on interpretation of meta-regression tests is summarized in Table 1. In the next 
section we will use these approaches in order to assess genuine empirical effects beyond random 
and selected misspecification biases. 
 
Table 1: MR tests for publication bias and empirical significance 
Test MRA model H1 Implications 
Funnel asymmetry 
Precision-effect iii eSeββt ++= )/1(10  0
0
1
0
≠
≠
β
β
 
Publication bias 
Genuine empirical effect 
Meta-significance iii vnααt ++= lnln 10  01 >α  Genuine empirical effect 
Joint precision-effect/ 
meta-significance Both of the above MRA tests 0
0
1
1
>
≠
α
  β
 Genuine empirical effect 
Source: Stanley, 2005 
 
 
4. Meta-analysis regression 
The standard meta regression model includes a set of explanatory variables (X) to integrate and 
explain diverse findings: 
ji
K
k
jikkjiji εXαSeββγ +∑++=
=1
01                                                                                                   (15) 
                                                 
7
 In such a case, the standard error can be omitted from the regression. 
8
 Longhi et al. (2006) weight each effect size by the square root of the sample size from which it is estimated. Since 
there is no relationship between the standard errors of the estimated effect sizes and the sample sizes from which they 
are estimated, standard errors can still be used as an explanatory variable in the meta-regression in order to correct for 
publication bias.  
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where γji is the reported estimate i of the jth study in literature, β expresses the true value of the 
parameter of interest, Xjik  is the independent variable which measures relevant characteristics of an 
empirical study and explains its systematic variation from other results in the literature, αk is the 
regression coefficient which reflects the biasing effect of particular study characteristics, and εji is 
the disturbance term.  
As it was mentioned in the previous section, meta-regression errors are likely to be 
heteroscedastic. Accordingly, a common practice in meta-regression analysis is to weigh each effect 
by some measure of precision of the estimated effect and then explain the heterogeneity in study 
results by means of a linear regression model estimated with weighted least squares (WLS). 
Dividing (15) by the standard error of the estimates we get: 
ji
K
k
jijikkjiji
ji
ji
eSeXSet
Se ∑
=
+++==
1
10 )/()/1( αββγ                                                                          (16). 
The previous regression may still lead to inefficient, though consistent, estimators, since it does 
not take into account the dependence among estimates obtained in the same study. In order to get 
correct standard errors, we adopt a “robust with cluster” procedure, adjusting standard errors for 
intra-study correlation.9 Each cluster identifies the study each estimate belongs to: this changes the 
variance-covariance matrix and the standard errors of the estimators, but not the estimated 
coefficients themselves.  
Finally, we adopt a specification that investigates on factors that determine whether the 
estimated effects are positive and significantly different from zero. The estimated model is given 
by: 
ji
K
k
jikkji eXbas ++= ∑
=1
                                                                                                                   (17) 
where the dependent variable is a dummy (s) that takes the value 1 if the estimated effect size is 
positive and statistically significant The probability that an estimated effect size is positive and 
significant is explained by a set explanatory variables (X) and estimated running a probit regression. 
 
4.1 Explanatory variables 
The set of variables X includes dummy variables and specification variables that account for 
differences in functional forms, types of regression, data definitions or sources, sample size, etc. 
Accordingly, we add two groups of explanatory variables: the first includes dummies explaining the 
diversity in the results from a methodological point of view; the second includes dummies regarding 
structural features of the studies considered. 
From a methodological point of view, we distinguish estimates obtained by cross-sectional 
regression models and by panel-data regression techniques; estimates obtained by pooled data; and 
estimates obtained with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator or with other estimators. Point 
estimates in our sample are obtained by studies based on cross-section data, or by studies using 
pooled cross-section time series or panel data. Panel data regression techniques are preferable to 
cross-sectional and pooled regression models, since the latter may be affected by an omitted 
variables bias, or they may be biased by the exclusion or mismeasurement of trading pair–specific 
variables (Baldwin, 2006). The dummy cross-section is equal to “1” if cross-sectional data are used 
and “0” otherwise; the dummy pooled  is equal to “1” if panel data are pooled and treated in a cross-
sectional regression model and “0” otherwise.10 Regarding the estimation method the dummy ols is 
equal to “1” if estimates are obtained through simple OLS and “0” whether estimates are obtained 
with other models (instrumental variable, Hausman-Taylor, etc.). 
                                                 
9
 The “robust” specification adopts the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance in place of the traditional one. 
Some authors (Jeppensen et al, 2002; Disdier and Head, 2004) adopt a panel specification, but such a choice seems 
questionable: since any ordering of estimates is arbitrary, the data do not form a proper panel.  
10
 To avoid collinearity problems we do not include an additional dummy variable for panel studies. 
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As far as the structural characteristics are concerned, some studies do not specify the type of 
agreement, while others include different dummies for each agreement. Accordingly, the dummy 
agreement takes the value “1” if the original paper used a variable for each type of agreement, and 
“0” otherwise. An important aspect to be considered is that several agreements in our dataset are 
more than simple free trade areas, for example EU, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, CACM, CISCU are 
customs unions,11 so that the integration between partners is deeper and, intuitively, their impact on 
trade should be higher. In order to account for that, we add a dummy cu taking values “1” for 
customs unions and “0” otherwise.  
Studies use different measures of bilateral trade flows. Even though the most frequently used 
measure is the average of bilateral trade, namely the average of the two-way exports,12 some studies 
focus on directional trade using only data on bilateral import or export flows. These differences are 
accounted for adding the dummy trade flow equal to “1” when the it refers to average bilateral trade 
flows, and equal to “0” when trade flows refer to imports or exports.  
We expect to find different effect sizes in studies that use sectoral data, since they may refer to 
sectors that are politically sensitive or more open to international trade. Accordingly, a dummy 
sector is added for estimates that assess the RTA effect on international trade using sectoral data. 
Since our database includes both published and unpublished studies, we use a dummy called 
published equal to “1” if papers are published in academic journals and 0 otherwise. We also 
distinguish papers that are primarily interested in estimating the RTA effect, from those including it 
as a simple control variable. The dummy used for estimates of these papers is called interested. We 
expect higher RTA effect both for published paper, since the choice of the reported estimates may 
be greatly affected by the preference of researchers for positive and larger results, and for paper that 
are primarily interested in estimating the RTA effect. Finally, an important aspect relates to the time 
period analyzed, so we use dummies for four periods: before 1970, the 70s, the 80s, and the 90s: 
these dummies collect the studies using data explicitly referring to different decades. 
  
4.2 Econometric results 
- Sample of 75 estimates 
Using a single observation raises the question of which one. Some meta-analyses identify a 
“preferred” estimate: while they try to choose the preferred/representative estimates to match the 
intentions, they do choose them (Card and Krueger, 1995; Rose and Stanley, 2005). Others use 
averages or medians of the estimates from each paper, or select a single measure either randomly or 
using a more objective statistical procedure, such as the highest R2 for the corresponding regression 
(Disdier and Head, 2004).  
Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) show that the procedures using a single value for each study generate 
misleading results. Indeed, if we look at the fixed and random effects estimates based on study’s 
minimum, median and maximum estimate of γ, we obtain very different results (Table 2). 
 
                                                 
11
 EU (European Union), CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market), MERCOSUR (Southern Cone 
Common Market), CACM (Central American Common Market), CISCU (Commonwealth of Independent States 
Customs Union). 
12
 Gravity models are usually estimated in log form, but most researchers commit a simple, but grave, error taking the 
log of the average with very unbalanced trade: the sum of the logs, as a metter of fact, is approximately the log of the 
sums, but the approximation gets worse as the two flows summed become increasingly different (Baldwin, 2006).  
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Table 2: Sensitivity of the choice of “preferred” estimate 
 
 
Pooled 
Estimate 
Lower Bound of 
95% CI 
Upper Bound 
of 95% CI 
p-value for 
H0: no effect 
test Q  
(p-value) H
2
 I2 
Fixed-effects 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.55 Min Random-effects 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.00 54.73 98% 
Fixed-effects 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.00 Median Random-effects 0.51 0.43 0.59 0.00 0.00 28.22 96% 
Fixed-effects 0.34 0.33 0.36 0.00 Max Random-effects 1.41 1.21 1.59 0.00 0.00 67.66 98% 
 
In all cases we reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity among estimates (Q-test: p=0.00) and 
the tests H2 and I2 confirm the results of Q test. Apparently, pooled estimates are decreasing as one 
moves towards the lower percentiles within studies.  
Moreover, 28 out of 75 minimum estimates are negative, and the pooled fixed effects estimate 
does not reject the hypothesis of no effect. All other estimates and their confidence bounds are 
positive and strongly reject the null hypothesis. The lowest estimate (minimum estimates – random 
effects) implies an increase in trade of 17%, while the highest estimate (maximum estimates – 
random effects) would be larger than 300%!  
Given these results, and considering that we would lose valuable information from studies that 
estimate gravity equations for multiple years, in the following we include in the meta-regression the 
largest possible number of available observations. 
- Sample of 1460 individual estimates 
Our database consists of 1460 effect sizes collected from 75 papers estimating the effect of 
RTAs on international trade. Figure 1 provides the kernel density estimates of the effect sizes. The 
mean RTA effect (vertical line) is 0.61 and the median is 0.42. These simple statistics do not make 
use of any information on the precision of each estimate. However, if we combine these effect sizes 
to test the null hypothesis that γ = 0, the F-test shows that this hypothesis is rejected at any standard 
significance level (prob. F-statistic = 0.00). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of RTA effects (γ). 
 
 
The estimated trade coefficients range from -3.97 to 10.84, though the majority of coefficients are 
clustered between zero and one. We employ the Grubbs test in order to detect the existence of 
outliers (Disdier and Head, 2004), finding 19 extreme values. However, the removal of these values 
does not significantly affect the results: in the following, then, we present the results obtained from 
the largest sample. 
The distribution in the Figure 1 is clearly lopsided, because few estimates (195 out of 1460) 
report negative RTAs effects. The values are not symmetrically distributed, with a longer tail to the 
right than to the left, and the distribution appears to be positively skewed. This is certainly not 
surprising, since economic theory predicts a positive impact of RTAs on trade. 
Table 3 shows combined meta-estimates of γ along with the p-values associated with the test of 
H0 of no effect and the test statistic Q, the tests H2 and I2. Differences between fixed and random 
effects estimates confirm a considerable heterogeneity among estimates. 
 
Table 3: Meta-Analysis of 1460 estimates of RTAs effect on trade 
 
Pooled 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound of 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound of 
95% CI 
p-value for 
H0: no 
effect 
test statistic Q 
(p-value) H
2
 I2 
Fixed-effects 0.10 0.094 0.098 0.00 
Random-effects 0.54 0.526 0.562 0.00 0.000 51.41 98% 
 
The hypothesis of no common RTA effect is easily rejected (p-value < 0.01), signalling the 
existence of a RTA effect on bilateral trade. The smaller fixed-effects estimate indicates that RTAs 
raise trade by 10% ( 1.011.0 =−e ), while the random-effects estimate indicates an increase by 72% 
( 72.0154.0 =−e ). Differences between fixed and random effects estimates show a considerable 
heterogeneity among estimates, also confirmed by the tests Q, H2 and I2.  
In Appendix 4 are reported both fixed and random effects estimates of γ for each of the 75 
studies along with the p-values associated with the significance test, as well as the tests for 
homogeneity within each study. For most of the studies null hypothesis of no effect is easily 
   Mean 
   0.61     
Sample        1    1460 
Max                  10.84     
Min                   -3.97 
Std. Dev             0.85 
Skewness           2.80 
Kurtosis           24.52 
Jarque-Bera    30085 
Prob.                  0.00 
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rejected at any standard significance level. The fixed and random effects estimators do not differ 
greatly in magnitude, but heterogeneity seems to be present within most of the individual studies. 
Since studies such a large heterogeneity cannot be summarized by the fixed-effects estimate, the 
random-effects estimate is to be considered more appropriate. 
Following Stanley (2005), we look for publication bias in our sample of disparate effects sizes. 
A simple way of identifying publication bias is to plot a funnel graph.  
 
Figure 2: Funnel graph of 1460 individual estimates 
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Even though the graph in Figure 2 slightly resembles a funnel, it does not present the symmetry 
that is crucial to exclude publication bias. Estimates of RTAs effects seem to indicate a positive 
effect on trade, but Figure 2 clearly shows that the plot is overweighted on the right side. Then 
publication selection assumes a particular direction.  
The six different estimates with the smallest standard errors do not differ significantly from each 
other. The average of the top six points on the graph, that is the estimates associated with the 
smallest standard errors, is equal to 0.04, implying a 4.1% increase in trade. Consequently, if 
research reporting was unbiased, estimates should vary randomly and symmetrically around the 
value 0.04, whereas the simple average of all 1460 estimates is 0.61, implying a 84% increase in 
trade.  
Table 4 reports the result of the MRA tests. Robust ordinary least squares estimation is used and 
standard errors are recorded in parenthesis. Both of these MRA test find evidence of a publication 
bias and an genuine empirical effect (β0≠0, β1≠0 and α1 > 0). The estimate of β0 reported in the first 
column of Table 4 is significant and confirms the apparent asymmetry of the funnel graph (Figure 
2). Table 4 shows signs of a positive RTA effect (β1, α1 > 0 and statistically significant): thus, we 
can say that MST finds evidence of a genuine empirical effect. 
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Table 4: MRA tests of Effect and Publication Bias 
Dependent Variables 
Variables 
 1: t 2:ln│t│ 
β0: intercept 
 
3.92*  
(0.18) 
-1.22*  
(0.15) 
β1: 1/Se 0.02*  
(0.01) 
- 
α1: Ln(n) - 0.27* 
(0.02) 
Obs 1460 1289 
R-squared 0.01 0.15 
S.E. of regression 6.29 1.20 
Column 2: studies not reporting the number of observations are excluded  
Standard errors  are reported in parenthesis – *: significant at 1 percent. 
 
Table 5 reports the meta-regression results for equation (16). Column 1 presents the estimated 
coefficients, while in columns 2 and 3 we report the standard errors and the standard errors adjusted 
for 75 studies/clusters, in order to show how the significance of some explanatory variables changes 
when we account for the dependence of estimates within each study. Results show an authentic 
common RTA effect on trade with a positive and significant impact on trade exceeding 30%.  
We find a significant and negative coefficients on the dummies for period ranges (except for the 
1970s). The effect size is much smaller before 1970, while the most recent studies seem to get 
higher estimates. Such a result is consistent with the often noted evolution from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep’ 
regional integration agreements, where the latter reduce trade costs through behind-the-border 
reforms. 
Regarding the variables introduced to explain the diversity of estimates from a methodological 
point of view, coefficients for the ols, cross-section and pooled dummies are not significant using 
“robust standard errors”. The fact that these estimates are not significantly different from the others 
seems to suggest that some of the “medal” mistakes of gravity models (Baldwin, 2006) – such as 
the omitted terms correlated with the trade-cost term – may not be so serious at the end of the day, 
or they are (partially, at least) handled through the inclusion of origin-nation and destination-nation 
dummies in a cross-section framework.  
Regarding the variables related to study characteristics, we find a negative and highly 
significant coefficient for the agreement dummy, suggesting that studies focusing on specific RTAs 
find lower values for the estimated γ. This means that estimation problems do not cancel out when 
all the RTAs are lumped together, rather they make the overestimation bias larger. 
The use of average bilateral trade flows leads to a significantly lower RTAs effect. The 
interpretation of this result is not straightforward. On the one hand, the negative sign could be 
explained by the smoothing effect due to the computation of averages. On the other hand, Baldwin 
(2006) pointed out a systematic mistake in the literature, namely the confusion between the log of 
the average and the average of the logs: such an error always make the bilateral trade look bigger. 
Since the consequences of the error are large only with very unbalanced trade, it may be the case 
that it is not particularly relevant for members of RTAs that often have bilaterally balanced trade. 
The coefficients regarding customs union and sectoral data are not statistically significant, so it 
is not confirmed the expectation that custom unions should imply a deeper integration. On the other 
hand, the dummies published and interested are positive and, especially in the case of the latter, 
strongly significant. This suggests the existence of another form of publication bias, since authors 
primarily interested in estimating the RTA effect tend to report larger effect sizes. 
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Table 5: Multivariate Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) of Common RTAs Effects 
*:significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%;  Moderator variables are divided by Se.  
 
- Focus on single RTAs. 
38 studies out of 75 estimate the RTAs impact on trade introducing different dummies for each 
trade agreement, yielding 1015 estimates. Table 6 summarizes the main results obtained for each 
RTAs.  
 
Variables Coefficient Standard Errors Robust with Cluster Standard Errors 
Intercept 3.44    0.21***  0.47*** 
1/Sei  0.27    0.03*** 0.13** 
Before 1970 -0.39    0.08***   0.12*** 
1970s -0.16 0.10                 0.14 
1980s -0.31    0.08***    0.10*** 
After 1990 -0.25    0.03***    0.04*** 
Cross-section 0.08    0.03*** 0.09 
Pooled  -0.14    0.02*** 0.14 
Ols 0.10    0.02*** 0.09 
Agreement -0.25    0.03***    0.10*** 
Cu -0.01 0.03 0.13 
Trade flow -0.19    0.03***    0.08*** 
Sector 0.07 0.08 0.17  
Published 0.06   0.03** 0.07 
Interested  0.19    0.03***    0.06*** 
Obs 
No of Clusters 
R-squared 
Prob > F 
S.E. of regression 
 
1460 
- 
0.17 
0.00 
5.77 
1460 
75 
0.17 
0.00 
5.77 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of estimates of single RTAs 
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RTAs 445 0.69 0.65 -3.97 4.83 
ADEAN 2 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.29 
AIFTA 10 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.10 
ANZER 10 0.83 1.23 -0.16 3.98 
AseanFTA 34 0.97 0.72 -0.07 2.35 
BFTA 24 2.96 0.43 2.37 3.77 
CACM 20 0.94 0.55 0.12 2.22 
CAN 2 1.19 0.00 1.19 1.19 
CARICOM 16 1.64 1.25 -0.35 4.41 
CEFTA 57 0.41 0.36 -0.51 1.52 
CISCU 6 2.66 0.60 1.98 3.37 
CUFTA 5 0.39 1.09 -0.35 2.29 
EFTA 274 0.25 0.50 -1.38 1.93 
EU 401 0.41 0.65 -2.03 4.71 
LAFTA 5 0.98 0.92 0.30 2.57 
LAIA 9 0.53 0.12 0.39 0.82 
MERCOSUR 40 0.64 0.70 0.12 4.35 
NAFTA 93 1.16 1.63 -1.47 10.84 
US-ISRAEL 7 0.46 0.61 -0.08 1.64 
 
The largest number of observations refers to generic RTAs, since the original studies do not 
specify the name of the trade agreement. Also for EU there are a large number of observations. 
Manifestly, the range between minimum and maximum estimates are very large for the most of 
agreements, showing the large variety of estimates provided by the literature. 
We carry out MAs of the RTAs for which we were able to collect effect sizes (Table 7). The tests 
show that random effects estimates would be the most appropriate in most of the cases. Only 5 out 
of the 19 agreements do not show significant differences between fixed and random effects 
estimates (in bold in the table), and most of these cases are characterized by a fairly low number of 
observations.  
The largest effect is registered for the Baltics-RTA (BFTA): the fixed effects estimate suggests an 
increase in trade around 2000%! Other agreements presenting exceedingly high estimates are the 
CISCU (1570%) and the Caribbean Community (376%).  
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Table 7: Meta-Analysis of estimates of specific RTAs 
RTA  Pooled Estimate 
Variation in  
Trade (%) 
Lower Bound 
of 95% CI 
Upper Bound 
of 95% CI 
test Q 
(p-value) H
2
 I2 No. of Estimates 
Fixed 0.23 26% -0.01 0.47 
ADEAN 
Random 0.23 26% -0.01 0.47 
0.84 0.04 0% 2 
Fixed 1.19 228% 0.98 1.40 
CAN 
Random 1.19 228% 0.98 1.40 
0.98 0.00 0% 2 
Fixed -0.35 -29% -0.37 -0.33 
CUFTA 
Random 0.32 38% -0.43 1.07 
0.00 8.72 89% 5 
Fixed 1.14 212% 1.07 1.21 
LAFTA 
Random 0.98 167% 0.16 1.81 
0.00 133.70 99% 5 
Fixed 2.94 1783% 2.69 3.19 
CISCU 
Random 2.82 1570% 2.38 3.26 
0.02 2.61 62% 6 
Fixed 0.78 118% 0.65 0.91 
US-ISRAEL 
Random 0.47 59% -0.24 1.17 
0.00 22.39 96% 7 
Fixed 0.52 68% 0.47 0.57 
LAIA 
Random 0.52 69% 0.45 0.60 
0.13 1.58 37% 9 
Fixed 0.07 7% 0.05 0.08 
AIFTA  
Random 0.07 7% 0.05 0.09 
0.18 1.40 29% 10 
Fixed 0.26 30% 0.19 0.33 
ANZCER  
Random 0.84 130% 0.00 1.67 
0.00 72.53 99% 10 
Fixed 0.78 117% 0.69 0.86 
CARICOM 
Random 1.56 376% 1.07 2.06 
0.00 28.47 96% 16 
Fixed 0.88 140% 0.81 0.94 
CACM 
Random 0.95 157% 0.72 1.18 
0.00 11.33 91% 20 
Fixed 3.03 1957% 2.92 3.14 
BFTA 
Random 3.06 2011% 2.91 3.21 
0.41 1.57 36% 24 
Fixed 0.79 119% 0.75 0.82 
AseanFTA  
Random 0.95 158% 0.74 1.17 
0.00 30.12 97% 34 
Fixed 0.35 42% 0.33 0.38 
MERCOSUR 
Random 0.58 77% 0.49 0.67 
0.00 13.56 93% 40 
Fixed 0.26 30% 0.24 0.28 
CEFTA 
Random 0.40 49% 0.30 0.50 
0.00 13.95 93% 57 
Fixed 0.87 138% 0.83 0.87 
NAFTA 
Random 0.96 159% 0.75 0.96 
0.00 18.54 95% 93 
Fixed 0.05 5% 0.04 0.05 
EFTA 
Random 0.25 28% 0.21 0.29 
0.00 15.36 93% 274 
Fixed 0.05 5% 0.05 0.05 
EU 
Random 0.34 41% 0.31 0.37 
0.00 67.50 99% 401 
 
Looking at the most widely studied agreements – EU, EFTA and NAFTA –, the largest impact 
is for NAFTA (159%), while the European agreements register much lower, but possibly more 
realistic values: 28% in the case of EFTA, 41% for the EU. It is also worth noting that custom 
unions – EU, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, CACM, CISCU – does not seem to consistently 
outperform the free trade areas in terms of trade impact. Indeed, in the meta-analysis regression the 
coefficient of the CU variable was never significant. 
 
4.3 Probit Significance Equation 
In our dataset of 1460 effect sizes, 942 are significantly different from zero at the level of 5%, 
and 887 of these estimates are positive. This is the sample used in the probit estimate (equation 17) 
with the same set of explanatory variables presented in section 4.1, adjusting the standard errors 
through the robust with cluster procedure. The computation of the marginal effects at the sample 
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means is shown in Table 8. The value at the mean of the linear combination of the explanatory 
variables (Z) is -0.7, while the marginal probability of finding a positive and significant impact on 
trade is 0.3. The estimates indicate that papers studying older agreements (or first stages of 
implementation) are less likely to detect a positive impact on trade: using data before 1970, for 
instance, reduces the probability by almost 25 percent. This confirms the evidence about the 
‘deepening’ of the liberalization implied by recent RTAs. 
Regarding the methodological variables, the probit regression confirms that cross-section estimates 
do not differ significantly from the other results. On the other hand, the coefficients for pooled data 
and OLS estimates present opposite signs. Using Pooled data, notwithstanding the “smoothing 
effect” mentioned above, increases the probability to find a positive impact by more than 11 
percent. On the contrary, OLS estimates are less likely to detect an impact. As it was mentioned in 
section 2, the OLS-estimator may yield biased and inconsistent estimates due to omitted variables 
and selection bias. Trade between any pair of countries is likely to be influenced by certain 
unobserved individual effects, if the unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, coefficients of the latter may be higher because they incorporate these unobserved effects. 
Indeed, it is very likely that the omitted pro-bilateral trade variables are positively correlated with 
the ‘variable of interest’, i.e. the RTA effect. The point is that the decision to join a trade agreement 
is not random, but rather driven by many factors, including many of the factors omitted from the 
gravity regression. Concerning the variables describing study characteristics, the use of data on 
specific agreements or the average of bilateral trade reduces the probability of estimating a positive 
impact on trade by 37 and 16 percent, respectively. Conversely, but not unexpectedly, published 
papers and studies explicitly focused on the estimation of the RTA impact on trade are much more 
likely to register significant and positive results.  
 
Table 8: Probit Analysis 
 
Probit Estimation Mean β Mean* β f(Z) β f(Z) 
Before 1970 0.077   -0.770** -0.059 0.321 -0.247 
1970s 0.085 -0.360 -0.031 0.321 -0.116 
1980s 0.124    -0.630** -0.078 0.321 -0.202 
After 1990 0.455 -0.230 -0.105 0.321 -0.074 
Cross-section 0.636           0.030  0.019 0.321  0.010 
Pooled  0.177     0.360**  0.064 0.321  0.116 
Ols 0.699 -0.190* -0.133 0.321 -0.061 
Agreement 0.697    -1.160*** -0.809 0.321 -0.373 
Cu 0.520 0.110  0.057 0.321  0.035 
Trade flow 0.478    -0.500*** -0.239 0.321 -0.161 
Sector 0.147        -0.040 -0.006 0.321 -0.013 
Published 0.538     0.530***  0.285 0.321  0.170 
Interested 0.490     0.770***  0.377 0.321  0.247 
Intercept -0.001     1.000*** -0.001   
Total   -0.658   
No. of Obs 
No. of Clusters 
1460 
75 
Wald χ2(13) 
(p-value) 
108 
(0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.16 
*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***:significant at 1%.   
 
 
5. Conclusion. 
RTAs have been widely studied, and the interest on this type of trade liberalization is likely to 
increase in the next future due to the crisis of the multilateral liberalization process. One way to 
carry out a comparative study of the empirical results is to simply tabulate authors, country, 
methodology, and results. However, for policy analysis and a better understanding of the consequences 
of RTAs, it is useful to complement broad qualitative conclusions with a more precise quantitative 
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research synthesis. This is the purpose of the present paper with respect to one core issue: the impact of 
these agreement on member countries’ bilateral trade flows. In particular, we decided to overcome 
the main limitations of qualitative reviews, summarizing statistically the whole body of work through 
meta-regression analysis. 
In this paper, we have investigated the result of previous studies analysing the effect of RTAs: 
the estimated effect varies widely from study to study and sometimes even within the same study. 
From the methodological point of view, this suggests the opportunity to retain all the available 
observations in most of our statistical analysis, though considering estimates from the same study as 
possibly correlated observations. Accordingly, by means of meta-analysis techniques, we 
statistically summarized 1460 estimates collected from a set of 75 studies. 
All combined estimates imply a substantial increase in trade, but they vary a lot depending on 
the estimation method. In particular, the ‘random-effects’ estimate entails an increase of 72%. The 
more modest ‘fixed-effects’ estimate (10%) cannot be trusted because its basis is undermined by 
obvious heterogeneity in this literature. However, there is also strong statistical evidence of 
publication selection, favoring the reporting of significantly positive trade effects: such publication 
bias causes all simple combined estimates of trade effects, whether fixed- or random-effects, to be 
exaggerated. 
Our analysis also provides a range of additional results helping to explain the wide variation in 
reported estimates. In this respect, meta-analysis statistical techniques are something more than 
mere weighted averages of all point estimates. Even if we avoid the temptation to assign “weights” 
(or “medals”, as in Baldwin, 2006) according to which of the studies we deem as good or bad, we 
can attempt to filter out biases due to the publication selection or possibly questionable 
methodological choices. For example, estimates obtained from pooled data are more likely to find a 
positive and significant impact, though they report smaller values. On the other hand, studies 
reporting OLS estimates are less likely to get (statistically speaking) “good results” and provide 
results that may be upward biased due to misspecifications and omitted variables. Several studies 
lump different trade agreements together and employ average trade flows: this has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of finding significant results, and lead to an underestimation of the impact 
on trade. Conversely, published papers and studies mainly interested in studying the RTAs’ impact 
are more likely to report significant results that tend to be overestimated.  
After filtering out the publication selection and other biases, the meta-analysis confirms a 
robust, positive RTA effect, equivalent to an increase in trade exceeding 30%. The estimates tend to 
get larger in recent years, and this could be a consequence of the evolution from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep’ 
trade agreements. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence of a differentiated impact according to 
the type of trade agreement. The custom union dummy, as a matter of fact, is never significant, but 
this may be due to the fact that some custom unions are only putative, since they have not been fully 
and consistently implemented. Indeed, in the case of a true custom union such as the EU, the MA 
estimate of the impact on trade (41%) largely exceeds the estimate for all the agreements combined. 
The meta-analysis of the trade effects of RTAs provide a combined estimate more plausible than 
some extreme values reported in the literature. Moreover, our results shed some light on the role 
played by some research characteristics in explaining the variation in reported estimates. However, 
our findings should still be considered as provisional, since there remains excess unexplained 
variation in our meta-regression models. 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
References 
 
Adam A., Kosma T. S., McHugh J. (2003), Trade-Liberalization Strategies: What Could 
Southeastern Europe Learn from the CEFTA and BFTA?, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/239. 
Aikeen (1973), The effect of the EEC and EFTA on European trade: A temporal Cross-section 
Analysis, The America Economic Review, vol. 63, no.5. 
Anderson J.E., van Wincoop E. (2003), Gravity With Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle, 
American Economic Review, 93(1): 170-192. 
Ashenfelter O., Harmon C., Oosterbeek H. (1999), A review of estimates of the 
schooling/earnings relationship, with tests for publication bias, Labour Economics, No. 6, pp. 453-
470. 
Baier, Bergstrand (2005), Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase Members’ International 
Trade? Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, WP 2005-3. 
Baldwin R.E. (1994), Towards an Integrated Europe, London: Centre for Economic Policy 
Research. 
Baldwin R.E. (2006), The Euro’s Trade Effects, European Central Bank Working Paper Series, 
594. 
Baxter M., Kouparitsas M. A . (2006), What determines bilateral trade flows?, NBER Working 
Paper No. 12188. 
Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1995), Is regionalism simply a diversion? Evidence from the evolution 
of the EC and EFTA, NBER WP 5283. 
Bergstrand J. (1985), The gravity equation in international trade: some microeconomic 
foundation and empirical evidence, The Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 474– 481. 
Bergstrand J. H. (1989), The Generalized Gravity Equation, Monopolistic Competition, and the 
Factor Proportions Theory in International Trade, Review of Economic and Statistics 71: 143-53. 
Bijmolt, T.H.A. and R.G.M. Pieters, 2001, Meta-Analysis in Marketing when Studies Contain 
Multiple Measurements”, Marketing Letters, 12(2): 157-169. 
Brada J. C., Mendez J. A. (1985 ), Economic integration among developed, developimg and 
centrally planned economics: a comparative analysis, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67, pp. 
549-56. 
Breuss F., Egger P. (1999), How reliable are estimations of East-West Trade potentials based 
on Cross-Section Gravity Analyses?, Empirica, 26, pp. 81-94. 
Bun M. J., Klassen F. J.G.M. (2002), Has the Euro increase Trade?, Tibergen Institute 
Discussion Paper 2002-108/2. 
Card D., Krueger A.B. (1995), Time-Series Minimum-Wage Studies: a Meta-analysis, The 
American Economic Review, 85(2): 238-243. 
Carrère C. (2006), Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trading Agreements on Trade Flows with 
Proper Specification of the Gravity Model, European Economic Review, 50, pp. 223-247. 
Cernat L. (2001), Assensing regional trade arrangements: are south-south RTAs more trade 
diverting?, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 16, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
Cheng I-H., Tsai Y-Y. (2005), Estimating the Staged Effects of Regional Economic Integration 
on Trade Volumes, Department of Applied Economics, Taiwan, unpublished. 
Cheng I-H., Wall H. J. (2004), Controlling for Heterogeneity in Gravity Models of Trade and  
Integration, Working Paper Series 1999-010E, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Clarete R., Edmonds C., Wallack J.S. (2003), Asian regionalism and its effects on trade in the 
1980s and 1990s, Journal of Asian Economics 14 91–129 
Colin J. R. (2005), Issues in Meta-Regression Analysis: an overview, Journal of Economic 
Surveys 19: 295-298 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
De Benedictis L., De Santis R.,Vicarelli C. (2005), Hub-and Spoke or else? Free trade 
agreements in the enlarged EU. A gravity model estimate, European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Istitutes, Working Paper No. 37. 
Disdier A. C., Head K. (2004), The Puzzling Persistence of the Distance Effect on Bilateral 
Trade, Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano, Development Studies Working Papers No. 186. 
Eaton J., Kortum S. (1997), Technology and Bilateral Trade, NBER Working Paper No. 6253. 
Egger P. (2005), Alternative Techniques for Estimation of Cross-Section Gravity Models, 
Review of International Economics, 13(5), pp. 881–891. 
Eichengreen, B., Irwin, D., 1996. The Role of History in Bilateral Trade Flows. NBER Working 
Paper No. 5565. 
Elliot R. J., Ikemoto K. (2004), AFTA and the Asian Crisis: Help or Hindrance to ASEAN intra-
regional trade?, Asian Economic Journal, vol. 18(1):1-10. 
Endoh M. (2000), The transition of post-war Asia-Pacific trade relations, Journal of Asian 
Economics 10, pp. 571–589. 
Faruquee H. (2004), Measuring the Trade Effects of EMU, IMF Working Paper WP/04/154. 
Fazio G., MacDonald R., Mélitz J. (2005), Trade costs, trade balances and current accounts: an 
application of gravity to multilateral trade, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5137. 
Feenstra R. C. (1998), Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 31-50. 
Feenstra, Markusen, Rose (2001), Using the gravity equation to differentiate among alternative 
theories of trade, Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 34, no.2. 
Fidrmuc J., Fidrmuc J. (2003), Disintegration and trade, Review of International Economics 
11(5): 811–829. 
Fisher R.A. (1932), Statistical Methods for Research Workers, 4th edn, Oliver andBoyd, 
London. 
Florax, R., de Groot H., de Mooij R. (2002), Meta-analysis in policy-oriented economic 
research, CPB, Report # 1: 21-24. 
Frankel J. A., Rose A. K. (2000), An estimate of the effect of currency unions on trade and 
output, CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 2631. 
Frankel J. A., Stein E., Wei S-J. (1995), Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural, the 
unnatural, and the super-natural, Journal of Development Economics Vol. 47, pp. 61-95 
Frankel J. A., Stein E., Wei S-J. (1997), Regional Trading Blocs. Institute for International 
Economics. 
Frankel J. A., Wei (1995), Open regionalism in a world of continental trade blocs, NBER 
Working Paper No.5272. 
Frankel J. A., Wei S-J. (1997), ASEAN in a Regional Perspective, in J. Hicklin, D. Robinson 
and A. Singh, eds., Macroeconomic Issues Facing ASEAN Countries. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Fratianni M., Kang H. (2006), Heterogeneous distance–elasticities in trade gravity models, 
Economics Letters 90, pp. 68–71 
Freund C. L., Weinhold D. (2004), The effect of the Internet on international trade, Journal of 
International Economics 62, pp. 171– 189 
Ghosh, Yamarik, (2004), Are regional trading arrangements trade creating? An application of 
extreme bounds analysis, Journal of International Economics, 63. 
Glass G.V., McGaw B., Lee Smith M. (1981), Meta-analysis in Social Research, Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills. 
Glick R., Rose A. K. (2002), Does a currency union affect trade? The time series evidence, 
European Economic Review 46(6): 1125–1151. 
Greenaway D., Milner C. (2002), Regionalism and Gravity, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 49, No. 5 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Grünfeld L. A., Moxnes A. (2003), The Intangible Globalization. Explaining the Patterns of 
International Trade in Services, NUPI Paper No. 657. 
Hassan (2001), Is SAARC a viable economic block? Evidence from gravity model, Journal of 
Asian Economics, 12. 
Heckman J. J. (1997), Instrumental Variables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions Used 
in Making Program Evaluations, Journal of Human Resources 32, No. 3, pp. 441-462. 
Hejazi ., Safarian A.E. (2005), NAFTA effects and the level of development, Journal of Business 
Research 58, pp. 1741– 1749 
Higgins J. P. T., Thompson S. G. (2002), Quantifying heterogeneity in a meta-analysis, 
Statistics in Medicine 21: 1539–1558. 
Jakab Z. M., Kovacs M. A., Oszlay A. (2001), How Far Has Trade Integration Advanced?: An 
Analysis of the Actual and Potential Trade of Three Central and Eastern European Countries, 
Journal of Comparative Economics 29, pp. 276–292 
Jarrell S. B., Stanley T. D. (1990), A meta-analysis of the union wage gap, Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review 44, pp. 54–67 
Jayasinghe, Sarker (2004), Effects of Regional Trade Agreements on Trade in Agrifood 
Products: Evidence from Gravity Modeling Using Disaggregated Data, Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development Iowa State University, Working Paper 04-WP 374. 
Jeppesen, T., List J.A., Folmer H., (2002), Environmental Regulations and New Plant Location 
Decisions: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, Journal of Regional Science, 42(1): 19-49. 
Kein N. T., Hashimoto Y. (2005), Economic analisys of ASEAN Free Trade Area; by a country 
panel data, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, No. 05-12. 
Kenen P. B. (2002), Currency unions and trade: Variations on themes by Rose and Persson, 
RBNZ DP/2002/08. 
Kimura F., Lee H-H. (2004), The Gravity Equation in International trade in Services, Kangwon 
National University, Korea, unpublished. 
Klein M. W. (2005), Dollarization and trade, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 
pp. 935-943. 
Knell M., Stix, H. (2005), The income elasticity of money demand: a meta-analysis of empirical 
results, Journal of Economic Surveys 19, pp. 513–533. 
Krueger A. (1999), Trade creation and trade diversion under Nafta, NBER WP.4729. 
Lee J-W., Park I., Shin K. (2004), Proliferating Regional Trade Arrangements: Why and 
Whither?, Korea University, unpublished. 
Lee J-W., Park I. (2005), Free Trade Areas in East Asia: Discriminatory or Non-
discriminatory?, The World Economy, Vol. 28, No.1, pp 21-48. 
Levine R., Renelt D. (1992), A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 
American Economic Review, 82 (4), pp. 942–963. 
Longhi S., Nijkamp P., Poot J. (2005), A meta-analytic assessment of the effect of immigration 
on wages, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, pp. 451–478. 
Longhi S., Nijkamp P., Poot J. (2006), The fallancy of “Job Robbing”, Tinbergen Istitute 
Discussion Paper, TI 2006-050/3. 
Martìnez-Galàn E., Fontoura M. P., Proenca I. (2005), Trade Potential in an Enlarged 
European Union: a recent approach, ISEG, unpublished. 
Martinez-Zarsoso I., Nowak-Lehman F. (2003), Augmented Gravity Model: An Empirical 
Application to Mercosur-European Union Trade Flows, Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 6, No. 
2, pp. 291-316. 
Martìnez-Zarzoso I., Horsewood N. (2005), Regional trading agreements: Dynamic panel data 
evidence from the gravity model, unpublished. 
Mayer T, Zignago S. (2005), Market Access in Global and Regional Trade, CEPII Working 
Paper No. 2005-02. 
Meade J. (1955), The theory of customs unions (North-Holland, Amsterdam). 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Melitz J. (2001), Geography, trade and currency union, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 2987. 
Melitz J. (2002), Language and foreign trade, University of Strathclyde working paper, 
unpublished. 
Micco A., Stein E., Ordon˜ ez G. (2003), The currency union effect on trade: Early evidence 
from EMU, Economic Policy, Vol. 37, pp. 316–356. 
Nijkamp P., Poot J. (2005), The last word on the wage curve?, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
Vol.19, pp. 421–450. 
Nilsson L. (2005), Comparative effects of EU and US trade policies on developing country 
exports, European Commission, TRADE Directorate General, unpublished. 
Nitsch V. (2002), Honey, I shrunk the currency union effect on trade, World Economy, Vol. 25, 
No. 4, pp. 457–474.  
Paiva C (2005), Assessing Protectionism and Subsidies in Agriculture: A gravity Approach, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/05/21.  
Pakko M. R., Wall H. J. (2001), Reconsidering the trade-creating effects of a currency union,  
FRB St. Louis Review, Vol. 83, No. 5, pp. 37–45. 
Rauch J. (1996), Networks versus markets in International Trade, NBER Working Paper No. 
5617. 
Rauch J., Trindade V. (1999), Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade, NBER Working 
Paper No. 7189. 
Rose A. K. (2000), One money, one market: Estimating the effect of common currencies on 
trade, Economic Policy, Vol. 30, pp. 9–45. 
Rose A. K. (2001), Currency unions and trade: The effect is large, Economic Policy, Vol. 33, 
pp. 449–461.  
Rose A. K. (2003), Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable?, NBER Working Paper No. 
10207. 
Rose A. K. (2004), Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 94(1). 
Rose A. K. (2005), One reason countries pay their debts: renegotiation and international trade, 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 77, pp. 189– 206 
Rose A. K., Engel C. (2002), Currency unions and international integration, Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 1067–1089. 
Rose A. K., Stanley T. D. (2005), Meta-analysis of the effect of common currencies on 
international trade, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, pp. 347–366. 
Rose A. K., van Wincoop E. (2001), National money as a barrier to trade: The real case for 
monetary union, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 386–390. 
Sanso M., Cuairan R., Sanz F. (1993), Bilateral Trade Flows, the Gravity Equation, and 
Functional Form, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 266-275 
Sapir A. (2001), Domino effects in Western European regional trade, 1960–1992, European 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, pp. 377-388 
Silva J. S., Tenreyro S. (2003), Gravity-Defying Trade, unpublished. 
Silva J. S., Tenreyro S. (2005), The Log of Gravity, CEPR Discussion Paper No.5311. 
Sissoko A. A. (2004), Measuring Trade Intensity within the European Zone, unpublished. 
Soloaga, Winters (2001), Regionalism in the nineties: What effect on trade?, North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 1-29 
Stanley T.D. (2001), Wheat From Chaff: Meta-Analysis as Quantitative Literature Review, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, pp. 131–150 
Stanley T. D. (2004), Meta-regression methods for detecting and estimating empirical effect in 
the presence of publication selection, Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Discussion Paper 2004–2, 
Hendrix College. 
Stanley T. D. (2005), Beyond publication bias, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, pp. 309–
346. 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Stanley T. D., Jarrell S. B. (1989), Meta-regression analysis: a quantitative method of literature 
surveys, Journal of Economic Surveys Vol. 3, pp. 54–67. 
Stanley T. D., Jarrell S. B. (1998), Gender wage discrimination bias? A meta-regression 
analysis, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 33, pp. 947–973. 
Stanley T. D., Jarrell S. B. (2005), Meta-regression analysis: a quantitative method of literature 
surveys, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, pp. 299–308. 
StataCorp. (2005), Stata Statistical Software: Release 9. College Station, TX: Stata-Corp LP. 
Subramanian A., Wei S.-J. (2003), The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly, NBER 
Working Paper No.10024. 
Subramanian A., Wei S.-J. (2005), The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly, CEPR 
Discussion Paper No 5122. 
Sutton A.J., Abrams K.R., Jones D.R., Sheldon T.A., Song F. (2000), Methods for Meta- 
Analysis in medical research, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2000. 
Tang D. (2005), Effects of the Regional Trading Arrangements on Trade: Evidence from the 
NAFTA, ANZCER and ASEAN Countries, 1989 – 2000, Journal of International Trade & Economic 
Development, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 241 – 265.  
Tenreyro S. (2001), On the causes and consequences of currency unions, Harvard University, 
unpublished.  
Thom R., Walsh B. (2002), The effect of a common currency on trade: Ireland before and after 
the sterling link, European Economic Review, Vol.46, No. 6, pp. 1111–1124. 
van den Bergh J., Button K.J. (1997), Meta-analysis of Environmental Issues in Regional Urban 
and Transport Economics, Urban Studies, 34(5-6), pp. 927-944. 
Verdeja L. (2005), EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements With Developing Countries Revisited, 
unpublished. 
Viner J. (1950), The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New 
York. 
World Bank,  (2005), Global Economic Prespectives 2005, Regional Trade Agreements: Effects 
on Trade, Chapter 3. 
Weichselbaumer D., Winter-Ebmer R. (2005), A meta-analysis of the international gender wage 
gap, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, pp. 479–512. 
Yeyati L. E. (2003), On the impact of a common currency on bilateral trade, Economics Letters 
Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 125–129. 
                                                                                       A Meta Analysis of the impact of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
APPENDIX 1 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements (in chronological order of date of entry into force) 
Trade Agreements Date Trade Agreements Date 
European Union (EU): 
Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands 
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 
Greece  
Portugal, Spain  
Austria, Finland, Sweden  
Cyprus, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Rep., Slovenia  
The Customs Union of West African States*: 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal 
European Free Trade Association  (EFTA):  
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Norway, Portugal 
Sweden  
Denmark 
Finland 
Austria 
Latin American Free Trade Agreement/Latin 
American Integration Agreement, (LAFTA/ 
LAIA):  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela  
African Common Market*:  
Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco 
Central American Common Market*:  
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica  
Economic Customs Union of the Central 
African States*:  
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM): 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana  
EU-EFTA/European Economic Area*  
Australia -New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) 
US-Israel  
US-Canada 
EFTA-Israel  
Central Europe Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA):  
Hungary, Poland, Romania 
Bulgaria 
EFTA-Bulgaria  
EFTA-Hungary 
EFTA-Poland  
EFTA-Romania  
EU-Hungary 
EU-Poland 
1958  
 
 
1973 
1981 
1986 
1995 
 
2004 
1959 
 
1960 
Until 1973 
Until 1986 
Until 1995 
1973 
1986-1995 
1995 
 
 
1961-1979, 1993 
ineffective 1980-1990 
reinitiated 1993 
1963 
 
1961-1975, 1993 
 
1965 
 
1966 
 
1968 
1995 
1973/1994 
 
1983 
1985 
1989 
1993 
 
1993 
1997 
1998 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
NAFTA:  
Canada, Mexico, United States 
Bolivia-Mexico 
Caribbean Community-Dominican 
Republic 
Costa Rica-Mexico  
EU-Bulgaria  
EU-Romania  
Group of Three:  
Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela 
Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur): 
 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay  
Caribbean Community-Dominican 
Republic 
Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa*:  
Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
Andean Community*:  
Columbia, Ecuador, Peru Venezuela.  
Customs Union: Columbia, 
Ecuador,Venezuela.  
Free Trade Area: Bolivia  
Peru 
Mercosur-Chile  
Mercosur-Bolivia  
Canada-Chile  
Canada-Israel 
Association of Southeast Nations 
ASEAN:  
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand 
Hungary-Turkey  
Hungary-Israel  
India-Sri Lanka  
Israel-Turkey  
Mexico-Nicaragua  
Romania-Turkey  
Poland-Israel  
Romania-Turkey  
Mexico-Chile  
EU-Israel Agreement  
EU-Mexico  
Poland-Turkey  
Mexico-Guatemala  
Mexico-Honduras  
Mexico-Israel  
Mexico-El Salvador  
New Zealand-Singapore  
1994 
 
1995 
 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
 
1991 
formed in 1991 and 
FTA in 1995 
1998 
effective 1998 
 
 
 
1995 
 
 
 
1995 
1997 
1996 
1996 
1997 
1997 
 
1998 
 
 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2000 
Source: Baier and Bergstrand, 2005 
      
* Free Trade Areas that a also Customs Unions.
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 Econometrics results from the literature 
Number of Estimates 
Selected Articles Trade Agreements* Sample Positive 
(significant**) 
Negative 
(significant**) 
1 Adam et al. 2003 BFTA, CEFTA, EU Cross-section data on Central and Eastern Europe total 
exports from 1992-2003  
9 
(8) - 
2 Aitken, 1973 EEC, EFTA Cross-sectional trade flow model considering European trade relations over the period 1951-67 
17 
(8) 
17 
(0) 
3 Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, Maurel, 2004 EU 
Panel of data on trade of 14 EU countries over the period 
1994-2001. 
6 
(3) - 
4 Baier, Bergstrand, 2005 RTAs Panel of cross-section time-series data at 5 year intervals from 1960 to 2000 for 96 countries 
17 
(12) 
8 
(4) 
5 Bayoumi, Eichengreen, 1995 EEC, EFTA Panel of cross-section time-series data at 2 year intervals from 1956 to 1973 
12 
(4) - 
6 Bergstrand, 1985 EEC, EFTA Cross-section using data for years 1965, 1966, 1975, 1976 for 15 OECD countries 
8 
(5) - 
7 Bergstrand,1989 EEC, EFTA Cross-section using data for years 1965, 1966, 1975, 1976 for 15 OECD countries 
70 
(44) 
2 
(0) 
8 Brada, Mendez, 1985 RTAs Cross-section using data for over period 1990-94 for all OECD countries 
3 
(1) - 
9 Breuss, Egger, 1999 EU 
Cross-section using data for years 1970, 1973, 1976 for 
member countries of EEC, EFTA CACM, LAFTA and 
Adean Community. 
3 
(3) - 
10 Bun, Klaassen, 2002 RTAs 
Panel data on bilateral exports between the 15 European 
Union countries and the G7 countries outside Europe 
(Canada, Japan and the U.S.) from 1965 through 2001 
3 
(3) - 
11 Carrère, 2006 CACM, EU, LAIA Panel data set including observations from over 130 
countries from 1962 to 1996 
25 
(25) - 
12 Cernat, 2001 AFTA, CARICOM, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA 
Cross-section dataset of more than 100 countries for three 
individual years: 1994, 1996, and 1998. 
16 
(12) 
4 
(0) 
13 Cheng, Tsai, 2005 
CUSFTA, EEC, EFTA, 
EU, LAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, NAFTA.  
Pooled cross-section over the period 1981-97 for 44 
exporting and 57 importing countries 
28 
(24) 
8 
(5) 
14 Cheng, Wall, 2004 
ANZCER, EU, 
MERCOSUR, NAFTA, 
US-ISRAEL 
Panel data including 797 unidirectional country-pairs in 
each of four years: 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 
20 
(11) 
5 
(1) 
15 De Benedictis et al., 2005  EU, EU-CEECs Panel data on bilateral trade flows between eight CEECs 
and the EU-23 over period 1993-2003 
2 
(1) - 
16 Eaton, Kortum, 1997 EFTA, EU Cross-section using 1990 data on trade in manufactures of 19 OECD countries 
7 
(1) 
1 
(0) 
17 Egger, 2005 RTAs 
Cross-section data on average 1990–97 bilateral exports of 
a sample of countries including OECD and non-OECD 
economies 
3 
(3) - 
18 Elliot, Ikemoto, 2004 ASEAN, EEC, EU, NAFTA 
Panel on data of APEC, ASEAN, EU, NAFTA and other 
16 countries over period 1982 to 1999 
28 
(23) - 
19 Endoh, 2000 ASEAN, EAEC Cross-section analysis using a data set of 80 countries for 
every five-year term from 1960 to 1995. 
50 
(48) 
2 
(0) 
20 Faruquee, 2004 RTAs Panel data for 22 industrial countries, sample period from 1992-2002 
12 
(0) 
2 
(0) 
21 Fazio et al, 2005 RTAs Cross-section analysis using a data set of annual 
observations for 134 countries over 1980-2000 
8 
(1) - 
22 Feenstra et al 2001 RTAs 
Five different cross-sections: 1970,1075, 1980, 1985, 1990. 
Sample of 110 countries considering differentiated and 
homogeneous goods.  
34 
(26) - 
23 Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2003 BFTA, CEFTA, EC, EC+EFTA, EFTA,  
Cross-section analysis using data on bilateral trade from 
1990 to 1998 for OECD countries and Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
130 
(116) 
5 
(5) 
24 Frankel,  Wei, 1997 EEC, EFTA Cross-sectional trade flow model considering 63 countries 
and data at 5 year intervals from 1960 to 1990 
35 
(14) 
11 
(1) 
25 Frankel, Rose, 2000  RTAs Panel data set including observations from over 180 
countries at 5-year intervals from 1970 through 1995 
4 
(4) - 
26 Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1995  EEC, EFTA Cross-sectional trade flow model considering 63 countries 
and data at 5 year intervals from 1965 to 1990 
25 
(10) 
11 
(0) 
27 Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1997 EC Cross-sectional trade flow model considering 63 countries 
and data at 5 year intervals from 1970 to 1990 
2 
(2)  
28 Fratianni, Kang, 2006 RTAs Cross-section analysis using data on bilateral trade from 1970 to 1999, at five-years intervals, for 175 countries. 
1 
(1) - 
29 Freund, Weinhold, 2004 RTAs Cross-section analysis using data on bilateral trade from 1995 to 1999 for 56 countries. 
5 
(1) - 
30 Ghosh, Yamarik, 2004 CACM, CARICOM, EEA, EFTA, EU, LAIA 
The data set consists of six annual observations for 186 
developing and developed countries. The annual 
observations are for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 
5 
(4) 
1 
(0) 
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1995 
31 Glick, Rose, 2002 RTAs Pooled panel, data set of 186 countries from 1948 to 1997. 1 (1) - 
32 Grünfeld, Moxnes, 2003  RTAs Cross-section analysis using data on service exports for 1999 and 2000 of  22 OECD countries. 
3 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
33 Hassan, 2001 EEC, NAFTA Cross-section analysis using  annual data  on bilateral trade flow of 27 countries in years 1996 and 1997.   
8 
(2) - 
34 Hejazi, Safarian, 2005 NAFTA Panel of data on U.S. trade with 52 countries over the period 1970 to 2002. 
2 
(2) - 
35 Jakab et al., 2001 CEE, CEFTA, EC+EFTA, MERCOSUR, NAFTA 
Cross-section of trade data from 1990 to 1997 for 53 
developed and non-developed countries. 
8 
(8) 
10 
(10) 
36 Jayasinghe, Sarker, 2004 NAFTA 
 
pooled cross-sectional time-series regression for trade of 
six selected agrifood products from 1985 to 2000 for 
NAFTA  
24 
(12) 
6 
(1) 
37 Kenen, 2002 RTAs Rose’s (2000) data set (113 countries for 1990) 6 (6) - 
38 Kien, Hashimoto, 2005 AFTA, EU, MERCOSUR,NAFTA 
Panel data on exports flows of 39 countries for the period 
1988-2002. 
12 
(11) 
4 
(3) 
39 Kimura , Lee, 2004 RTAs 
Cross-section data on bilateral services trade and goods 
trade between 10OECD countries and other countries 
(OECD members and non OECD members) for the years 
1999 and 2000. 
42 
(30) 
4 
(0) 
40 Klein, 2002 RTAs 
Cross-section of annual observations on 165 countries (27 
industrial countries and 138 non-industrial countries) from 
1948 to 1997 
14 
(7) - 
41 Klein, 2005 RTAs 
Cross-section of annual observations on 165 countries (27 
industrial countries and 138 non-industrial countries) from 
1948 to 1997 
6 
(6) 
1 
(0) 
42 Krueger, 1999 EU, ANZCER pooled time-series-cross-section regression using data from 1987 to 1997 for members of various PTAs. 
12 
(1) 
4 
(0) 
43 Lee et al., 2004 RTAs Panel data set of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999. 15 (14) - 
44 Lee, Park, 2005 
RTAs, AFTA, ANZCER, 
CACM, CAN, CARICOM, 
EC/EU, EFTA, 
MERCOSUR, NAFTA, 
and US-Israel FTA. 
Panel data set of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999. 18 (12) 
4 
(1) 
45 Martìnez-Galàn et al, 2005 EU 
Cross-section analysis using data on trade  of manufactured 
products between EU25 and Eastern European countries  
from 1999 to 2002 
1 
(0) 
3 
(0) 
46 Martìnez-Zarzoso, Horsewood, 2005 
CACM, CARICOM, EU, 
NAFTA Sample of 47 countries from 1980 to 1999. 
30 
(28) - 
47 Martìnez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, 2003 EU, MERCOSUR 
Panel data of a sample of 20 countries, 15 EU countries and
5 Mercosur countries, from 1988 to 1996 
28 
(27) - 
48 Mayer, Zignago, 2005 
RTAs, ADEAN, ASEAN, 
EU, MERCOSUR, 
NAFTA 
Cross-section analysis data for 67 developing and 
developed countries over the period 1976-1999. 
26 
(21) - 
49 Meliz, 2001 RTAs Frankel and Rose (2000) database 4 (4) - 
50 Meliz, 2002 RTAs Frankel and Rose (2000) database 3 (3) - 
51 Micco et at, 2003 RTAs Panel data set including information on bilateral trade for 22 developed countries from 1992 to 2002. 
13 
(5) 
5 
(1) 
52 Nilsson, 2005 EEA, NAFTA Cross-section analysis for the 2001-2003 period of EU and US imports from developing countries. 
4 
(2) - 
53 Nitsch, 2002 RTAs Rose’s (2000) data set. 15 (15) - 
54 Paiva, 2005 RTAs Data set covers bilateral trade in agricultural goods for 152 
countries over the periods 1990–93 and 1999–2002. 
5 
(5) - 
55 Pakko, Wall, 2001 RTAs Rose’s (2000) data set 6 (3) - 
56 Rauch, 1996 EEC, EFTA Cross-section, data on 63 countries for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 
42 
(6) 
30 
(11) 
57 Rauch, Trindade, 1999 EEC,EFTA Cross-section, data on 63 countries for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 
29 
(4) 
19 
(2) 
58 Rose, 2000 RTAs Panel data, bilateral observations for five during 1970-90 
covering 186 countries 
50 
(50) 
3 
(1) 
59 Rose, 2003 RTAs Panel data, bilateral observations for five during 1950-2000 
covering 175 countries. 
12 
(12) - 
60 Rose, 2004 RTAs Panel data, bilateral observations for five during 1950-2000 
covering 175 countries. 
6 
(6) - 
61 Rose, 2005 RTAs Panel data, bilateral observations for five during 1950-2000 
covering 150 countries. 
17 
(16) - 
62 Rose, Engel, 2002 RTAs Cross-section analysis using a data set of annual 4 - 
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observations for 210 countries between 1960 and 1996 (4) 
63 Rose, van Wincoop, 2001 RTAs Panel data on bilateral observations for five during 1970-95 
covering 200 countries. 
2 
(2) - 
64 Sanso et al., 1993 EEC, EFTA Cross-section of annual observations on trade in 16 OECD 
countries from 1964 to 1987 
27 
(11) 
1 
(0) 
65 Sapir, 2001 EFTA Cross-section, annually over the period 1960–1992 on the 240 bilateral trade flows 
18 
(0) 
15 
(4) 
66 Silva, Tenreyro,  2003 RTAs Cross-section analysis of 137 countries in 1990. 6 (6) - 
67 Silva, Tenreyro,  2005 RTAs Cross-section analysis of 137 countries in 1990. 12 (10) - 
68 Sissoko, 2004 BFTA, CEFTA Panel of 36 countries of the European zone with annual data during the period 1988 – 2000.  
27 
(19) - 
69 Subramanian, Wei 2003 RTAs Panel data set of annual data over the period 1960–1992 on the 240 bilateral trade flows 
34 
(32) - 
70 Subramanian, Wei 2005 RTAs Panel data set of annual data over the period 1960–1992 on the 240 bilateral trade flows 
32 
(31) 
1 
(0) 
71 Tang, 2005 ANZCER, ASEAN, NAFTA 
The data set covers the bilateral trade flows for 21 
countries from 1989 to 2000. 
10 
(8) - 
72 Tenreyro, 2001 RTAs Panel data set of annual observations for over 200 countries from 1978 to 1997. 
4 
(4) - 
73 Thom, Walsh, 2002 AIFTA, EEC Panel and cross-section analysis for Anglo–Irish trade over the period 1950–1998 
13 
(7) 
7 
(4) 
74 Verdeja, 2005 EFTA Cross-section data covering 137 countries for the period 1973-2000. 
11 
(6) 
4 
(1) 
75 Yeyati, 2003 RTAs Rose’s (2000) data set (186 countries for 1995) 10 (10) 
- 
 
* RTAs indicates estimates that do not specify the type of agreement. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Papers included in the database 
Descriptive Statistics 
Ranges 
References Nb. of Estimates Min Max 
Simple 
Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Adam et al. 2003 9 0.48 3.69 1.70 1.16 
Aitken, 1973 34 -0.21 0.89 0.16 0.33 
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, Maurel, 2004 18 -0.51 3.37 0.98 1.28 
Baier, Bergstrand, 2005 25 -3.97 2.51 0.12 1.19 
Bayoumi, Eichengreen, 1995 12 0.01 0.21 0.07 0.07 
Bergstrand, 1985 8 0.18 0.73 0.47 0.24 
Bergstrand,1989 72 -0.11 1.93 0.73 0.48 
Brada, Mendez, 1985 3 3.77 4.83 4.43 0.57 
Breuss, Egger, 1999 3 0.29 0.42 0.38 0.08 
Bun, Klaassen, 2002 3 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 
Carrère, 2006 25 0.22 0.99 0.58 0.21 
Cernat, 2001 20 -0.72 4.41 1.05 1.42 
Cheng, Tsai, 2005 35 -0.35 4.35 0.74 1.00 
Cheng, Wall, 2004 25 -0.16 3.98 0.59 0.97 
De Benedictis et al., 2005  2 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.02 
Eaton, Kortum, 1997 8 -0.12 0.54 0.23 0.23 
Egger, 2005 3 0.52 1.29 0.78 0.44 
Elliot, Ikemoto, 2004 28 0.10 2.35 0.55 0.56 
Endoh, 2000 52 -0.07 1.93 0.85 0.50 
Faruquee, 2004 14 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Fazio et al, 2005 8 0.10 0.27 0.17 0.05 
Feenstra et al 2001 34 0.18 2.20 1.09 0.53 
Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2003 135 -0.15 3.96 0.68 0.98 
Frankel,  Wei, 1997 46 -0.41 1.15 0.21 0.33 
Frankel, Rose, 2000  4 1.16 1.31 1.25 0.06 
Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1995  36 -0.32 1.51 0.16 0.36 
Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1997 2 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.05 
Fratianni, Kang, 2006 2 1.04 1.37 1.21 0.23 
Freund, Weinhold, 2004 5 0.02 0.28 0.16 0.09 
Ghosh, Yamarik, 2004 6 -0.11 2.22 0.79 1.02 
Glick, Rose, 2002 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 . 
Grünfeld, Moxnes, 2003  4 -0.14 0.17 0.02 0.13 
Hassan, 2001 8 0.22 4.71 2.45 1.78 
Hejazi, Safarian, 2005 2 7.90 10.84 9.37 2.08 
Jakab et al., 2001 18 -2.03 0.69 -0.17 0.84 
Jayasinghe, Sarker, 2004 30 -1.47 3.76 0.83 1.13 
Kenen, 2002 6 0.59 2.32 1.12 0.64 
Kien, Hashimoto, 2005 16 -0.46 2.23 0.41 0.62 
Kimura , Lee, 2004 48 0.19 0.65 0.36 0.12 
Klein, 2002 14 0.07 2.35 0.85 0.59 
Klein, 2005 7 -0.48 2.52 0.99 0.88 
Krueger, 1999 2 0.07 0.50 0.29 0.30 
Lee 2004 15 0.09 2.57 0.64 0.58 
Lee, Park, 2005 22 -0.35 1.97 0.65 0.61 
Martìnez-Galàn et al, 2005 4 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
Martìnez-Zarzoso , Horsewood, 2005 30 0.12 2.63 1.16 0.66 
Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, 2003 28 0.04 0.65 0.24 0.16 
Mayer, Zignago, 2005 26 0.08 2.44 1.46 0.77 
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Meliz, 2001 4 1.03 1.24 1.16 0.10 
Meliz, 2002 3 1.00 1.02 1.01 0.01 
Micco et at, 2003 18 -0.19 0.10 0.03 0.06 
Nilsson, 2005 4 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.01 
Nitsch, 2002 15 0.68 1.28 1.07 0.19 
Paiva, 2005 5 1.01 1.15 1.10 0.05 
Pakko, Wall, 2001 6 0.05 0.91 0.43 0.40 
Rauch, 1996 72 -1.18 1.11 0.03 0.47 
Rauch, Trindade, 1999 48 -0.64 0.46 0.07 0.31 
Rose, 2000 54 -0.97 1.54 0.78 0.45 
Rose, 2003 12 0.18 1.50 0.92 0.38 
Rose, 2004 6 0.94 1.50 1.19 0.18 
Rose, 2005 17 0.07 0.75 0.53 0.21 
Rose, Engel, 2002 4 0.75 0.95 0.88 0.09 
Rose, van Wincoop, 2001 2 0.46 1.09 0.78 0.45 
Sanso et al., 1993 28 -0.05 1.32 0.34 0.35 
Sapir, 2001 33 -0.54 0.34 0.01 0.26 
Silva, Tenreyro,  2003 6 0.26 0.79 0.44 0.26 
Silva, Tenreyro,  2005 12 0.14 1.29 0.48 0.36 
Sissoko, 2004 27 0.21 2.64 1.57 0.77 
Subramanian, Wei 2003 34 0.18 1.99 0.90 0.39 
Subramanian, Wei 2005 33 -0.13 1.99 0.93 0.45 
Tang, 2005 10 0.26 1.83 0.80 0.60 
Tenreyro, 2001 4 0.29 0.70 0.53 0.19 
Thom, Walsh, 2002 20 -0.10 0.74 0.11 0.25 
Verdeja, 2005 15 -1.38 1.90 0.39 0.90 
Yeyati, 2003 10 0.47 1.00 0.58 0.16 
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APPENDIX 4 
 Within-Study Meta-Analysis of RTAs effect on trade 
Study  Coefficient H0 : γ = 0 (p-value) 
test Q  
(p-value) H
2
 I2 Heterogeneity 
Fixed 0.91 0.00 Adam et al. 2003 
Random 1.61 0.00 
0.00 45.26 98% High 
Fixed 0.20 0.00 Aitken, 1973 Random 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.78 44% Moderate 
Fixed 0.51 0.00 Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, Maurel, 2004 Random 0.94 0.00 0.00 25.55 96% High 
Fixed 0.14 0.00 Baier, Bergstrand, 2005 Random 0.16 0.03 0.00 25.78 96% High 
Fixed 0.09 0.00 Bayoumi, Eichengreen, 1995 Random 0.08 0.00 0.02 2.08 52% Moderate 
Fixed 0.45 0.00 Bergstrand, 1985 Random 0.46 0.00 0.01 2.71 63% Moderate 
Fixed 0.80 0.00 Bergstrand,1989 Random 0.76 0.00 0.00 3.92 74% High 
Fixed 4.34 0.00 Brada, Mendez, 1985 Random 4.34 0.00 0.93 0.07 0% Low 
Fixed 0.38 0.00 Breuss, Egger, 1999 Random 0.38 0.00 0.43 0.86 0% Low 
Fixed 0.05 0.00 Bun, Klaassen, 2002 Random 0.05 0.00 0.03 9 89% High 
Fixed 0.51 0.00 Carrère, 2006 Random 0.57 0.00 0.00 13.06 92% High 
Fixed 0.47 0.00 Cernat, 2001 Random 1.04 0.00 0.58 17.18 94% High 
Fixed 0.18 0.00 Cheng, Tsai, 2005 Random 0.70 0.00 0.00 168.97 99% High 
Fixed 0.30 0.00 Cheng, Wall, 2004 Random 0.60 0.00 0.46 54.08 98% High 
Fixed 0.12 0.01 De Benedictis et al., 2005 Random 0.12 0.01 0.74 0.11 0% Low 
Fixed 0.20 0.01 Eaton, Kortum, 1997 Random 0.20 0.01 0.43 1.00 0% Low 
Fixed 0.87 0.00 Egger, 2005 Random 0.80 0.00 0.00 6.22 84% High 
Fixed 0.33 0.00 Elliot, Ikemoto, 2004 Random 0.49 0.00 0.00 13.51 93% High 
Fixed 0.73 0.00 Endoh, 2000 Random 0.83 0.00 0.00 12.01 92% High 
Fixed 0.00 0.83 Faruquee, 2004 Random 0.00 0.83 1.00 0.07 0% Low 
Fixed 0.17 0.00 Fazio et al, 2005 Random 0.17 0.00 0.98 0.21 0% Low 
Fixed 1.23 0.00 Feenstra et al 2001 Random 1.14 0.00 0.00 12.44 92% High 
Fixed 0.05 0.00 Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2003 Random 0.49 0.00 0.00 34.58 97% High 
Fixed 0.25 0.00 Frankel,  Wei, 1997 Random 0.23 0.00 0.00 2.13 53% Moderate 
Fixed 1.25 0.00 Frankel, Rose, 2000 Random 1.25 0.00 0.79 0.35 0% Low 
Fixed 0.45 0.00 Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1995 Random 0.23 0.00 0.00 3.43 71% High 
Fixed 0.29 0.00 Frankel, Stein, Wei, 1997 Random 0.29 0.00 0.52 0.42 0% Low 
Fixed 1.20 0.00 Fratianni, Kang, 2006* Random 1.20 0.00 0.00 9.55 90% High 
Fixed 0.11 0.01 Freund, Weinhold, 2004 Random 0.12 0.01 0.29 1.24 20% Low 
Fixed 0.38 0.00 Ghosh, Yamarik, 2004 Random 0.74 0.03 0.00 47.12 98% High 
Fixed 0.99 0.00 Glick, Rose, 2002* Random 0.99 0.00 - - - - 
Fixed 0.03 0.70 Grünfeld, Moxnes, 2003 Random 0.03 0.70 0.56 0.70 0% Low 
Fixed 2.61 0.00 Hassan, 2001 Random 2.61 0.00 0.44 0.98 0% Low 
Fixed 8.68 0.00 Hejazi, Safarian, 2005 Random 8.68 0.00 0.42 0.64 0% Low 
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Fixed -0.44 0.00 Jakab et al., 2001 Random -0.18 0.15 0.00 484.32 100% High 
Fixed 0.69 0.00 Jayasinghe, Sarker, 2004 Random 0.81 0.00 0.00 4.71 79% High 
Fixed 0.77 0.00 Kenen, 2002 Random 0.86 0.00 0.07 2.04 51% Moderate 
Fixed 0.19 0.00 Kien, Hashimoto, 2005 Random 0.41 0.01 0.00 92.80 99% High 
Fixed 0.37 0.00 Kimura , Lee, 2004 Random 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.02 0% Low 
Fixed 0.87 0.00 Klein, 2002 Random 0.87 0.00 0.01 2.15 54% Moderate 
Fixed 1.06 0.00 Klein, 2005 Random 1.04 0.00 0.00 6.12 84% High 
Fixed 0.10 0.13 Krueger, 1999 Random 0.21 0.29 0.10 2.64 62% Moderate 
Fixed 0.49 0.00 Lee et al., 2004 Random 0.55 0.00 0.00 32.78 97% High 
Fixed 0.51 0.00 Lee, Park, 2005 Random 0.62 0.00 0.00 20.54 95% High 
Fixed -0.02 0.82 Martìnez-Galàn et al, 2005 Random -0.02 0.82 0.99 0.03 0% Low 
Fixed 0.95 0.00 Martinez-Zarzoso, Horsewood, 2005 Random 1.11 0.00 0.00 10.49 90% High 
Fixed 0.06 0.00 Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, 
2003 Random 0.18 0.00 0.00 23.05 96% High 
Fixed 1.53 0.00 Mayer, Zignago, 2005 Random 1.49 0.00 0.00 23.74 96% High 
Fixed 1.16 0.00 Meliz, 2001 Random 1.16 0.00 0.45 0.88 0% Low 
Fixed 1.01 0.00 Meliz, 2002 Random 1.01 0.00 0.99 0.02 0% Low 
Fixed 0.02 0.00 Micco et at, 2003 Random 0.02 0.19 0.00 8.51 88% High 
Fixed 0.27 0.00 Nilsson, 2005 Random 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0% Low 
Fixed 1.06 0.00 Nitsch, 2002 Random 1.07 0.00 0.08 1.57 36% Moderate 
Fixed 1.10 0.00 Paiva, 2005 Random 1.10 0.00 0.85 0.34 0% Low 
Fixed 0.53 0.00 Pakko, Wall, 2001 Random 0.43 0.01 0.00 17.23 94% High 
Fixed 0.03 0.35 Rauch, 1996 Random 0.04 0.47 0.00 3.16 68% Moderate 
Fixed 0.10 0.00 Rauch, Trindade, 1999 Random 0.10 0.01 0.00 1.54 35% Moderate 
Fixed 0.10 0.00 Rose, 2000 Random 0.83 0.00 0.01 85.92 99% High 
Fixed 0.82 0.00 Rose, 2003 Random 0.92 0.00 0.00 12.86 92% High 
Fixed 1.18 0.00 Rose, 2004 Random 1.18 0.00 0.00 1.69 41% Moderate 
Fixed 0.60 0.00 Rose, 2005 Random 0.54 0.00 0.00 9.53 90% High 
Fixed 0.88 0.00 Rose, Engel, 2002 Random 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.35 0% Low 
Fixed 0.83 0.00 Rose, van Wincoop, 2001 Random 0.78 0.01 0.13 16.27 94% High 
Fixed 0.32 0.00 Sanso et al., 1993 Random 0.35 0.00 0.79 7.19 86% High 
Fixed -0.02 0.68 Sapir, 2001 Random -0.01 0.90 0.00 1.55 36% Moderate 
Fixed 0.35 0.00 Silva, Tenreyro,  2003 Random 0.42 0.00 0.00 5.45 82% High 
Fixed 0.41 0.00 Silva, Tenreyro,  2005 Random 0.46 0.00 0.02 9.01 89% High 
Fixed 1.48 0.00 Sissoko, 2004 Random 1.46 0.00 0.00 1.99 50% Moderate 
Fixed 0.86 0.00 Subramanian, Wei 2003 Random 0.88 0.00 0.00 6.80 85% High 
Fixed 0.90 0.00 Subramanian, Wei 2005 Random 0.92 0.00 0.00 9.00 89% High 
Tang, 2005 Fixed 0.76 0.00 0.00 18.02 94% High 
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 Random 0.80 0.00     
Fixed 0.53 0.00 Tenreyro, 2001 Random 0.53 0.00 0.00 5.16 81% High 
Fixed 0.04 0.00 Thom, Walsh, 2002 Random 0.10 0.00 0.00 18.54 95% High 
Fixed 0.07 0.00 Verdeja, 2005 Random 0.40 0.01 0.00 6.06 84% High 
Fixed 0.58 0.00 Yeyati, 2003 Random 0.58 0.00 0.05 1.91 48% Moderate 
* Studies with only one estimate. 
